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larrypeseckis/README.md
Larry Peseckis — AI and Cloud Security Architect. Capability is not authority. Success is not proof. A proposed action must cross an authority boundary before consequence. Conceptual schematic, not telemetry.

BUILDING   /   TESTING   /   WRITING   /   TEACHING   /   RESEARCHING

I work at the intersection of offensive security, cloud architecture, and AI risk. Thirty years of mission-critical defense and aerospace systems shaped the question behind this work:

When the machine can act, what makes the action authorized—and what evidence shows that the boundary held?

This is my public workbench. Tools, test fixtures, research, field notes, and explanations that make complicated systems easier to reason about.

Building

01 / TOOLS + FIXTURES
Make the mechanism inspectable.

Burp CC Bridge — a localhost REST API for repeatable, authorized web-security lab workflows. Java. ATT&CK Pulse — public threat reporting turned into queryable trend evidence. Python and PostgreSQL.

Build notes — what these systems actually do

Burp CC Bridge exposes Burp Suite Community Edition's HTTP capabilities through a local REST API for scripted, authorized testing.

ATT&CK Pulse extracts MITRE ATT&CK technique references from public threat intelligence into a queryable dataset. Reporting patterns are not the same thing as adversary prevalence.

The working surface: cloud infrastructure, Linux, identity, containers, infrastructure as code, delivery pipelines, and observability. The point is the control that actually runs—not the box on the architecture slide.

Testing

02 / AUTHORITY BOUNDARIES
Test the assumption, not just the happy path.

Agentic Browser Boundary Tests — benign local scenarios, inert canaries, and evidence logs for scoped-authorization boundaries. Frontier Cyber Risk Evaluation — labeled cyber-assistance prompts, an automated judge, and blind human comparison.

Test notes — scope, evidence, and failure modes

Agentic Browser Boundary Tests asks whether webpage content can cause an agent to cross a boundary that only the user should authorize. Six local scenarios cover hidden instructions, game framing, cross-page retrieval, scoped authorization, read-versus-submit grants, and incremental scope creep. Inert canaries. Local evidence. Per-test findings—not a universal safety verdict.

Frontier Cyber Risk Eval pairs a labeled evaluation set with an automated judge and a blind human-comparison harness. A high agreement score does not settle whether the judge covered the difficult cases.

Field lab archive CTF Archive that connects offensive and defensive practice through documented attack chains, detection opportunities, and lessons learned.

Writing

03 / FIELD NOTES
The interesting failure is often the one that looks like success.

Field note Question under examination
The Signature Was Valid. The Authority Wasn't. Who said “go” is not the same question as who was allowed to.
The Human Approved It. Which “It”? Does the approval still bind to the action that actually executes?
The Tool Was Read-Only. The Consequence Wasn't. Is the safety property enforced—or merely attached to a name?

Open the writing archive →

Teaching

04 / CLEAR MENTAL MODELS
If the explanation cannot survive a curious kid, keep working on it.

Robot Explains — comic-style lessons and games about computers, cybersecurity, and AI for kids, parents, teachers, and curious humans.

Robot Explains turns web, cybersecurity, and AI concepts into illustrated explanations, guided learning, and games. What is it? Why does it matter? How do I use it safely?

Side channel — sometimes the explanation is satire

Bigger Sandbox — Containment, but bigger this time.

Privacy™ — Search anyone. Know everything. Be wrong at scale.

Satirical sites about containment theater and surveillance overconfidence. The joke is the interface. The subject is the assumption underneath it.

Researching

05 / FORMAL QUESTIONS
Keep separate questions separate. Make the relationships explicit.

MICRM — Machine-Initiated Consequence Reference Model. Distinguishes consequence structure, authority and accountability closure, contribution-sensitive candidacy, and evidentiary warrant. Formal research with explicit limitations.

MICRM is a formal reference model for machine-initiated consequence attribution. It distinguishes consequence structure, authority and accountability closure, contribution-sensitive candidacy, and evidentiary warrant rather than silently substituting one for another.

Scope matters: this is a reference model with stated limits—not a completed theory or a universally validated, substrate-neutral framework.

Research index — adjacent models and control questions

Frontier Cyber Risk Taxonomy — cyber-assistance classification across uplift, autonomy, authorization verifiability, and cumulative capability transfer.

Agent Security Threat Model — trust boundaries across agents, tools, browsers, files, APIs, and cloud resources.

Agent Tool Permission Matrix — default-deny grants tied to risks, required controls, and enforcement points.

Safety-Router Transparency — useful explanations without turning disclosure into an oracle for an attacker.


Operating principle: Task success is not system correctness. Build the system. Test the assumption. Keep the evidence.

MAIN SITE   /   FIELD NOTES   /   ROBOT EXPLAINS   /   LINKEDIN

Independent public work. No employer endorsement implied. Claims travel with their scope, limitations, and evidence.

Pinned Loading

  1. frontier-cyber-risk-taxonomy frontier-cyber-risk-taxonomy Public

    Four-tier model-policy taxonomy for AI-assisted cyber requests, mapping uplift, autonomy, authorization, and cumulative capability transfer.

  2. frontier-cyber-risk-eval frontier-cyber-risk-eval Public

    A four-tier taxonomy of cyber assistance for frontier models, a 57-prompt eval set that operationalizes it, and an LLM-as-judge scorer with a blind human-comparison harness. Includes a pilot run th…

    Python

  3. attck-pulse attck-pulse Public

    Pipeline extracting MITRE ATT&CK technique mentions from public threat intelligence reports for trend analysis

    Python

  4. burp-cc-bridge burp-cc-bridge Public

    REST API automation for Burp Suite Community Edition. Drop-in Java extension exposing send/repeat/history endpoints over a local HTTP API.

    Java 7

  5. ctf-rooms ctf-rooms Public

    300+ documented red team, blue team, cloud, DFIR, and LLM security labs with attack chains, detections, and lessons learned.

  6. micrm micrm Public

    Formal reference model for authority, accountability, and evidentiary warrant in machine-initiated consequence attribution. Specification, paper, and adversarial validation record.

    Shell 1